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Michael L. Kennedy- The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution: The Middle 
Years. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. xi, 440. 
In the second volume of his trilogy on Jacobinism, appropriately dedicated to 
the archivists of France, Michael L. Kennedy continues his important portrait of the 
revolutionary clubs. The story of the middle years spans the period from the opening 
of the Legislative Assembly, on 1 October 1792 until the Parisian insurrection of 31 
May-2 June 1793, which deposed the Girondins and brought the Mountain to power. 
Organized topically, the book discusses such significant issues as the clubs' fluctuat-
ing membership, economic policy, mobilization for war, the role of anticlericalism 
and the press, the fall of the monarchy, federalist sentiment and the Girondin-
Montagnard schism. As in volume one, Kennedy concludes with a valuable essay on 
archival sources. 
In a field often characterized by harsh words and partisanship, Kennedy es-
chews theorizing. He prefers, as he states, "to recount what happened, to present the 
evidence" (ix). The strength of this approach is the impartiality, thoroughness and 
geographical scope of the research, which utilized archival evidence from Paris and 
67 departments. Emerging from this patient work is a new perspective on the 
relationship of Jacobins in Paris to their counterparts in the provinces. In particular, 
Kennedy shows that there was a core of vital provincial clubs that were relatively 
independent of, and sometimes even more progressive than, the Parisian "mother 
society" until important organizational changes in the spring of 1793. 
During this period, over 1,500 clubs operated, many of them ephemerally, 
throughout France. As one might have predicted, the composition of the clubs became 
less middle-class, though leadership remained in the hands of the literate elite. 
According to Kennedy, "the soul of a small society was likely to be the cure" (39), a 
finding that raises interesting questions about the role of Catholicism as a breeding 
ground for revolutionary ideology. Although some clubbists were freethinkers and 
Deists in the spirit of Rousseau, provincial Jacobins more typically supported the 
constitutional clergy, used Biblical texts to support their arguments and displayed a 
puritanical aversion to swearing and gambling. 
In terms of economic policy, a number of provincial clubs abandoned a strict 
laisserjaire viewpoint quite early on. By the autumn of 1792, clubs in Marseille, 
Lyon, Dijon and La Rochelle had demanded price controls and regulations on the 
grain trade; the Parisian club began to accept such ideas only the following spring. 
Kennedy suggests that some of the initial support for economically liberal policies 
may have been generated from reverence for the law, a political concern, rather than 
solely from economic interest. His evidence raises the larger issue of the meaning of 
economic regulation for the bourgeoisie. What concretely did economic deregulation 
and reregulation mean for different groups within the bourgeois elite during the 
revolution? Should laisser-faire be used as the litmus test of what constitutes "bour-
geois" economic policy? 
Politically, the typical Jacobin was a "hawk" who favored a revolutionary war 
of liberation and was prone to a belief in conspiracy theories. According to Kennedy, 
it was primarily the use of the royal veto that converted these law-revering constitu-
tional monarchists into reluctant republicans. Most clubs endorsed the death penalty 
for the king, but were dismayed, and sometimes confused, by the factionalism tearing 
apart the Parisian club and Convention after the trial. The most interesting section of 
the book deals with the political feud between the Girondins and Montagnards. 
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Kennedy supplies a useful corrective to works that equate Jacobinism with the 
centralizing, violent ideology of the Mountain during the Terror. In the winter of 
1793, the majority of Jacobin clubs still had Girondist tendencies, and many expressed 
an ongoing hatred for "bloodthirsty" Montagnard leaders in Paris, like Marat and 
Robespierre. Highly respectful of the law, these Jacobins were horrified at the 
September massacres and impatient at the delays in drafting a republican constitution. 
Kennedy traces the decline in Girondin influence to French defeat in war and a rash 
of tactical errors. Apparently, some Girondins even supported sending Montagnard 
representatives on mission to the provinces as a way to rid the capital of their political 
rivals. Through their propaganda and reorganization of clubs, the militant repre-
sentatives helped to tip the clubbists' political allegience back to the Mountain and to 
curtail sharply earlier provincial independence. By June 1793, a minority of radicals 
called the shots more than ever before. 
While Kennedy's depiction of the divisions within Jacobinism in this period is 
fascinating, his explanation for such schism is not fully satisfying. The author 
attributes the feud between Girondins and Montagnards to class consciousness and 
dismisses Fran~ois Furet's concern with ideology and power. It may be true, as 
Kennedy argues, that "popular" societies open to the lower-class members tended to 
be pro-Montagnard, but occupational identity was not necessarily an accurate predic-
tor of political choices. The leadership of both Girondist and Montagnard clubs 
remained bourgeois and, as other research on federalism has shown, some artisans 
also participated in anti-Montagnard sectional revolts. One problem is that Kennedy 
treats rhetoric as a direct reflection of socio-economic status. It may be just as likely 
that some Jacobin leaders, themselves bourgeois, were using a new language of class 
in order to pursue their own goals - whether humanitarian, political or economic. 
Unfortunately, one is not always sure what these goals were, or what constituted the 
fundamental assumptions of the Montagnard and Girondin world views. It would 
have been helpful had Kennedy made some of the paradoxes of the period more 
explicit. The Girondins are usually considered more "moderate", but despite their 
professed Jove of the Jaw and their denunciation of Parisian riots and massacres, this 
group was not completely above using violence when it served their cause. Kennedy 
does a good job of portraying the suspicion of many provincial clubs toward the 
turbulent Parisian sections and dictatorially-inclined Montagnard leaders like Marat. 
But why, then, were other clubs from politically autonomous regions, like Marseilles 
and Lille, consistently pro-Mountain? Purges by representatives on mission help to 
explain part of the shift of Girondist local clubs back to the Montagnard fold. Yet, 
some club members seem to have been persuaded by the message of these radicals. 
Why? The answers to such questions will probably best be pursued in explicitly 
comparative local studies, like that of Hubert C. Johnson on the Midi, which delve 
into political struggles and develop a multi-faceted typology of revolutionary leaders-
hip from the ground up. Kennedy has provided a great service to historians in his rich 
narration of Jacobin organization, but it will remain to others to develop an explicit 
interpretive framework that illuminates fully his story. 
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